CARLYLE F. GRONNING, in his official capacity as Chairman Commissioner of the Industrial Commission of Utah v. HERBERT F. SMART, in his -official capacity as Director of Finance, Department of Finance, State of Utah, and Administrator of the State Insurance Fund; DAVID S. MONSON, State Auditor; and DAVID L. DUNCAN, State Treasurer : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
CARLYLE F. GRONNING, in his official capacity
as Chairman Commissioner of the Industrial
Commission of Utah v. HERBERT F. SMART, in
his -official capacity as Director of Finance,
Department of Finance, State of Utah, and
Administrator of the State Insurance Fund; DAVID
S. MONSON, State Auditor; and DAVID L.
DUNCAN, State Treasurer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
A. Wally Sandack; Special Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondents.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Joseph P. McCarthy; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gronning v. Smart, No. 14846.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1610
/ 7i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARLYLE F. GRONNING, in his 
official capacity as Chairman 
Commissioner of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
Plaintiff-
Respondents, 
-vs-
HERBERT F. SMART, in his 
-official capacity as Director 
of Finance, Department of 
Finance, State of Utah, and 
Administrator of the State 
Insurance Fund; DAVID S. 
MONSON, State Auditor; and 
DAVID L. DUNCAN, State 
Treasurer, 
Case No. 14846 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal for a declaratory judgment by the Third 
Judicial District for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., holding House Bill 
No. 373, 41st Legislature and House Bill No. 91, 41st 
egi^tatj^?^ 1976 constitutional. 
DEC 13 1976 
..v-v-sa 
Clerk,"Sup*** Court. Utah 
A. WALLY SANDACK 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P, MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Attorney for Respondents 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machin -generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT •. . . 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS A 
STATE AGENCY WHICH EXERCISES THE 
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ENTIRELY 
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE FUND 3 
POINT II: THE INSURANCE FUND IS A STATE 
ADMINISTERED MUTUAL INSURANCE 
PROGRAM AND THE MONEY OR ASSETS 
THEREIN ARE THE PROPERTY OF 
CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYERS 7 
POINT III: THE TAKING OF ASSETS FROM THE 
INSURANCE FUND FOR THE OPERATION 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 
I SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 14 
CONCLUSION , . 16 
CASES CITED 
Chez, Atty. Gen. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 
90 U. 447, 62 P.2d 549, 108 A.L.R. 365 
(1936) 10, 
Moran v. State, Okla., 534 P.2d 1282 (1975) 12 
Golden R. Allen v. Glen Swenson, 3rd Dist, 1969, 
Case No. 187,703 14 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
TABLE OF CONTENTS CON'T. 
Page 
STATUTES CITED 
H.B. No. 375, 41st Legislature 1975 1 
H.B. No. 91, 41st Legislature 1976 1 
Chapter 263, L. 1969 14 
Section 34-20-3, U.C.A. 1953..... 4 
Section 34-20-10, U.C.A. 1953 4 
Section 34-22-1, U.C.A. 1953... 4 
Section 34-22-13, U.C.A. 1953..... 4 
Section 34-22-14, U.C.A. 1953 4 
Section 34-23-2, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 34-23-11, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 34-28-9, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 34-29-21, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 34-30-5, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 34-35-3, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 34-36-2, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 35-1-12, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 35-1-15, U.C.A. 1953.. 5 
Section 35-1-16, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 35-1-41, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 35-1-46, U.C.A. 1953 5,7,9 
Section 35-1-82.51, U.C.A. 1953 5 
Section 35-2-2, U.C.A. 1953 ... ............. 6 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS CON'T. 
Pag 
Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. 1953 8 
Section 35-3-3, U.C.A. 1953 8 
Section 35-3-4, U.C.A. 1953 9 
Section 35-3-10(2), U.C.A. 1953........ 9 
Section 35-3-10(4), U.C.A. 1953 9 
Section 35-3-16, U.C.A. 1953 9 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED 
Article 1, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 2, 
14th Amendment, Constitution of United States... 2, 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARLYLE F. GRONNING, in his 
official capacity as Chairman 
Commissioner of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 
Plaintiff-
Respondents, 
~vs~ 
HERBERT P. SMART, in his 
official capacity as Director 
of Finance, Department of 
Finance, State of Utah, and 
Administrator of the State 
Insurance Fund; DAVID S. 
MONSON, State Auditor; and 
DAVID L. DUNCAN, State 
Treasurer, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Case No. 14846 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment 
which declared constitutional Item No. 33, House Bill 
No. 373, 41st Legislature 1975 General Session, and 
Item No. 39, House Bill No. 91, 41st Legislature 1976 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Budget Lassion, which respectively appropriated 
$358,000.00 and $408,200.00 from the State Insurance 
Fund to the Industrial Commission. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court held that the two enact-
ments were constitutional and did not violate the provisions 
of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution or the 
14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the order and 
judgment of the District Court and declaration by the 
Supreme Court that the appropriations of money from the 
Insurance Fund to the Industrial Commission are unconsti-
tutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since this case was decided on motions for 
summary judgment, there are no serious disputes as to 
the facts. The complaint, together with the attached 
documents, sets out the problem quite fully and also 
sets out the factual background. 
To be quite brief, this action was filed 
after the Attorney General had issued an opinion dated 
-2-
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February 20, 19 75, holding that the Legislature could 
not constitutionally appropriate Insurance Fund money 
to finance the programs of the Industrial Commission. 
[R. 3 ] # There were attempts made to seek a court 
determination of the question prior to the 1976 Budget 
Session, but this was not done, and with knowledge of 
the opinion the Legislature again appropriated Insurance 
Fund money to the Industrial Commission. [R.4-6 ]. it 
also appears that the practice existed before, apparently 
following a time when Insurance Fund inspectors were 
paid by the Fund but worked entirely for the Industrial 
Commission. The money so appropriated in 1975 and 1976 
had not been released to the Commission and it became 
necessary for the Chairman to file this action for 
declaratory relief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS A 
STATE AGENCY WHICH EXERCISES THE 
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ENTIRELY 
WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE FUND. 
In 1917, Utah recognized that the common law 
afforded little relief to an injured workman. It 
established the Industrial Commission to administer a 
no fault program for compensating workmen who were 
-3-
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injured in the course of employment. The cost of the 
program was to be carried by employers and was to be 
passed along to consumers as a part of production 
costs. The Commission was given authority in contested 
situations to determine whether the injury was in the 
course of employment and to determine the extent of 
injury and to determine the amount of the award. 
Of course the Commission has a much broader 
scope of duty and authority than the administration 
and adjudication of claims of workmen, and these duties 
and areas of authority continue to increase as the 
Legislature and Congress become more and more concerned 
over the years about the life, health, welfare and 
conditions of employment of all classes of employed 
people. 
The Commission is the labor relations board 
for the State of Utah (34-20-3) and is empowered to 
prevent unfair labor practices in intrastate commerce 
(34-20-10); it may permit mines or smelters to employ 
workers for more than eight hours per day if it certifies 
that such work is not detrimental to the life, health, 
safety and welfare of such men (34-21-2); it may regulate 
conditions- involving employment of women and minors 
(34-22-1, et seq.), including the establishment of 
minimum wages (34-22-13) and maximum hours (34-22-14). 
-4-
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The Commission may permit exceptions in some cases for 
employment of youth under eighteen in hazardous 
occupations (34-23-2) and is to enforce the requirements 
of the chapter relating to school and age limitations 
placed on certain categories of employment (34-23-11). 
The Commission is to insure compliance with requirements 
for payment of wages (34-28-9). It must approve an 
applicant who wishes to operate an employment agency 
(34-29-21). It has jurisdiction to determine whether 
a contractor has violated provisions of law relating 
to public contracts (34-30-5). The Commission is to 
enforce the Anti-discrimination Act (34-35-3). It is 
to adopt rules and regulations relating to motor vehicles 
furnished by an employer to transport workers to and 
from places of employment (34-36-2) . The Commission is 
to see that places of employment are safe and that 
safety devices and safeguards are employed (35-1-12) 
and may inspect to secure compliances (35-1-15) and . 
to exercise the extensive powers of supervision and 
control set out in 35-1-16. It may require information 
from employers to carry out the purposes of the title 
(35-1-41) and may impose sanctions upon an employer who 
has not secured compensation (35-1-46). It must ad-
judicate claims for compensation (35-1-82.51, et seq.). 
The Commission administers the Occupational Disease Act 
-5-
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(35-2-2). It also administers the Unemployment Security 
Act. 
The purpose of the enumeration of the duties 
and responsibilities of the Commission are simply to 
illustrate that it is responsible for the exercise of 
a great deal of the State's police power as it applies 
to employment. 
As Plaintiff-Respondent pointed out in his 
memorandum in support of his motion for summary 
judgment [R. 73 ], after describing the enforcement 
for health, safety and welfare as the traditional role 
of the Industrial Commission says that, "The State 
Insurance Fund possesses no such power. It is con-
sistent with the purposes behind all Workmenf s Compen-
sation Acts that the safety inspection program rests 
with the same agency that has the duty and power to 
enforce laws for the protection of an employee's life, 
health, safety and welfare. . ." 
It is apparent that the Insurance Fund has 
no responsibility for the work of the Commission, has 
no enforcement power whatever and no duty to enforce 
laws, policies or rules of the State or the United 
States relating to the health, safety or welfare 
of employees. 
-6-
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POINT II 
THE INSURANCE FUND IS A STATE 
ADMINISTERED MUTUAL INSURANCE 
PROGRAM AND THE MONEY OR ASSETS 
THEREIN ARE THE PROPERTY OF 
CONTRIBUTING EMPLOYERS. 
A* Nature of the Fund. 
The Legislature imposed a duty upon employers 
to secure compensation to injured employees and imposed 
sanctions, both civil and criminal/ for failure so to 
do, 35-1-46, U.C.A. 1953. This section permits employers 
to secure such compensation in one of three ways: 
1. By insuring with the State Insurance 
Fund; 
2. By insuring with a private insurer; 
3. By being self-insured upon satis-
factory proof of financial ability 
to the Industrial Commission. 
The purpose of the insurance requirement is to 
guarantee recovery by the injured employee upon entitle-
ment . 
The State Insurance Fund was established ". . . 
for the purpose of insuring employers against liability 
for compensation . . . and of assuring to the persons 
entitled thereto the compensation provided by law. Such 
fund shall consist of all premiums and penalties received 
-7-
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and paid into the fund, of property and securities 
acquired by and through the use of moneys belonging 
to the fund, and of interest earned, . . Such fund 
shall be applicable to the payment of losses sustained 
on account of insurance, to the payment of compen-
sation, and to the payment of salaries and other 
expenses charged against it in accordance with the 
provisions of this title. . . . In the conduct and 
administration of the business of said fund the 
commission of finance may appoint . . . a manager, 
and may employ accountants, inspectors, attorneys, 
physicians, investigators, clerks, stenographers and 
such other experts and assistants as it deems advisable." 
(Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, emp. added.) 
The commission of finance is to administer the 
fund, write compensation insurance, conduct all business 
11
. . . and do any and all things in connection with all 
insurance business to be carried on . . . and is vested 
with full authority over said fund. It may do any and 
all things. . . which are necessary or convenient in 
the administration thereof or in connection with the 
insurance business carried on by it under the provisions 
of this title as fully and completely as the governing 
body of a private insurance carrier. . • ." (Section 
35-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, emp. added.) 
-8-
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The commission must establish classes of 
employment and risks in order to determine proper 
premiums to get the lowest possible rate consistent 
with the maintenance of a solvent fund and the creation 
of a surplus and reserve. [35-3-4, 35-3-10(2)]. If 
a balance remains after making provisions required by 
law and the judgment of the commission to meet possible 
obligations of the fund, the commission is to declare 
a lump sum dividend for the benefit of policyholders 
[35-3-10(4)]. The Legislature also saw fit to impose 
a premium tax on the fund equal to that imposed on 
insurance companies [35-3-16]. 
It appears clear that the Insurance Fund is 
in effect a state sponsored insurance company by which 
employers can secure required coverage under Section 
35-1-46, at the lowest possible rate, and if there is 
accumulated more money than required by the Fund, 
secure a dividend. 
The Fund is not an arm of the State existing 
to enforce requirements calling for safe places to work 
or to eliminate hazards which result in occupational 
diseases. These functions of the Industrial Commission 
would exist quite independently of any provisions of law 
assuring recovery of monies due to injured workmen. 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. The Fund Belongs to Contributing Employers. 
The definitive case in Utah is Chez, Atty. Gon. v. 
Industrial Comm. of Utah, 90 U. 447, 62 P.2d, 549, 108 
A.L.R. 365. The Fund had purchased bonds issued by the 
town of Scipio which sought to compromise an obligation 
of $7,517.40 for $7,200.00. The direct question was 
whether the debt was an "indebtedness to the State11. 
The Court held that within the meaning of the Consti-
tution it was not such a debt. 
The Court determined to examine the nature of 
the State Insurance Fund to see what it really is. ". . * 
It will be noted that the basic source of the fund is the 
premiums and penalties — nothing else. . . . It is paid 
on account of the employer for compensation for which he 
is primarily liable. (court's emphasis). See American 
Fuel Co. of Utah v. Industrial Comm., 55 U. 483, 187 P. 
633, 8 A.L.R. 1342. The employer really pools his premiums 
in the State Fund to create a fund for the payment of an 
obligation for which it is liable. It is a common fund 
belonging to the participating employers. . . !l (62 P. 2d 
549, 550 emp. added.) 
The court pointed out that had employers so 
pooled their money under management which they selected, 
there would be no question as to the nature of the fund. 
-10-
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" . . . But basically it is no different than if the state 
and a number of private employers agreed to establish their 
own fund. It was made easier by setting up a skeleton fund 
to begin with, giving the Industrial Commission the ad-
ministration of it and providing by law for rules and 
regulations to govern it. That reaches more quickly and 
more easily the same result as a mutual company would have 
reached. It served to give employers. . . a means to get 
the insurance practically for the costs of the compensation 
without charges for profits or acquisition and in addition 
gave it a public aspect and made its administration and 
management subject to public audit, inspection, and 
responsibility. But it did not change the essential 
nature of the venture. It was a venture by the state as 
an employer and certain private employers who chose to 
come in, in which they pooled their premiums to create a 
fund for the purpose of paying, not a state obligation or 
making expenditures on behalf of the state but of paying 
their own contingent compensation liabilities. . . fl 
(62 P.2d 549, 550 emp. added.) 
" . . . Thus, the state in effect says: 'We 
will create, establish, manage, collect and administer 
through the Industrial Commission but as an agent and 
trustee only for the contributing employers' . . „ . 
-11-
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balances earned ^ M not needed as reserves are turned 
where? Not to the state but back to the contri butin.j 
employers. . . It belongs, not to the state, but to_ 
the contributing employers for their mutual benefit. 
It constitutes a pooling of risks under the auspices 
of the state. (cites omitted.) . . ."62 P.2d 549, 
551. 
What becomes obvious then is that the Fund 
is owned by contributing employers, held in trust by 
the State, established to cover liabilities of em-
ployers under the workmen's compensation laws of the 
state. The Fund may be charged for necessary expenses 
incurred in operation, but its nature is unchanged, 
c.f. Moran v. State, Okla. 1975, 534 P.2d 1282. 
C. Power of the Fund to Employ Necessary 
Personnel. 
Defendants-Appellants concede that the 
Insurance Fund was intended to sustain itself finan-
cially, and that it may be charged for necessary 
servies such as the costs of audits, and may employ 
sufficient people to perform services for its purposes, 
to include attorneys, claims adjusters, actuaries, 
secretaries and the like. 
-12-
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Assuming that the Fund is interested, as any 
insurer would logically be, in holding claims against 
the Fund to a minimum, it is apparently within the 
power of the Fund to employ inspectors either to make 
sure that proper premiums are charged for risks assumed 
or to eliminate or reduce hazards of employment for 
its policyholders. In the case of the Fund, such a 
program might well reduce premiums or cause higher 
dividends to be returned to contributing employers. 
In the case of a private insurer, the savings could 
result in a reduction of premium charges or in in-
creased profits. It should be pointed out that in 
neither case could an employer be required to follow 
safety suggestions so made nor could the Fund or 
private insurer compel compliance by closing the 
plant or exercising other police powers. A decision 
by an insurer to deny coverage or to increase the 
premium to insure a particular employer does not 
constitute an exercise of State Police Power. 
The program theorized above is quite 
different than a levy upon the assets of the Fund 
to support the general regulatory function of the 
Commission. 
-13 -
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POINT III 
THE TAKING OF ASSETS FROM THE 
INSURANCE FUND FOR THE OPERATION 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 
I SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
From what has already been reviewed above, the 
money in the Insurance Fund is not State owned funds 
subject to general appropriation by the Legislature. 
The money belongs to the employers who paid it into the 
common pool, Chez v. Ind. Comm., (supra). 
The Third District Court in Golden R. Allen v. 
Glen Swenson, (1969), Case No. 187,703, has held that 
Chapter 263 L. 1969, which provided for transfer of 
$8,100,200.00 from the Fund to the General Fund for 
use by the State Building Board was void because of 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. An appeal was filed in Allen v. 
Swenson, but was dismissed when the Legislature re-
pealed the "appropriation". 
The money in the Fund is not public money 
which can be used to meet expenses of government. 
It is a trust fund to be used to meet liabilities of 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
employers when an employee is entitled to compensation. 
The effort here is made to expend trust funds for govern-
mental purposes. 
The safety program is a general duty of the 
Industrial Commission and is not carried on at the 
request of or for the particular benefit of the Fund* 
It is no more the responsibility of the Fund than of 
self insuring employers or of private insurance com-
panies to carry out inspection programs and it is 
obvious that no such "duty" exists. It is no answer 
to the expropriation of employers' money from the 
Fund to say that a certain percentage of employers 
satisfy their contingent obligation to pay for injury 
or disability by using the vehicle of the Fund whether 
the percentage is five, sixty or eighty five, and 
should therefor pay a cost which would be paid for 
by taxes; nor is it an answer to say that since the 
Fund may charge a lower premium than a private carrier, 
it should "contribute" in lieu of taxes paid by a 
private insurer a certain part of costs of the 
Commission, since it is rather apparent that a 
"self-insurer" as an insurer pays nothing at all, 
not even a premium tax imposed on private companies 
and on the Fund. 
-15-
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The taking of the money from the Insurance 
Fund in such amounts as appear to be available without 
standards of any kind, without any representation of 
employers of any kind, without any kind of hearing or 
notice, as the Legislature has sought to do clearly 
constitute a taking of property in violation of the 
Constitution since there is no compensation to the 
owners, and the taking is from only one class of 
employers, those who insure with the Fund, as con-
trasted with those who insure with private carriers 
or those who are self insured. Such discrimination 
cannot be approved by this Court, no matter how 
worthy the purpose may be. 
If the Fund in fact has had some Seven 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($700,000.00) in unneeded 
funds, the amount should be returned to contributing 
employers. In fact the Legislature simply applied 
trust funds to its own use, a situation highly 
disapproved of in the case of private trustees. 
CONCLUSION 
Unless this Court overrules its decision 
in Chez v. Industrial Comm., (supra) it cannot escape 
the conclusion that the Fund belongs to contributing 
-16-
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employers who are entitled to receive dividends of 
money not needed by the Fund to meet its operating 
costs, claims against the Fund, and to provide a 
reserve against catastrophes if any should occur. 
The appropriation of Insurance Fund 
moneys to the use of the Commission to perform its 
duties as a unit of government exercising state 
police power is an invasion of trust funds by the 
State as a trustee without any substantial claim 
of legal right* The taking also deprives the 
owners of the Fund of their property without due 
process of law. 
The appropriation cannot be justified as 
an indirect employment of personnel to accomplish a 
direct benefit for the Fund, nor does the fact that 
the illegal practice may have existed for some time 
justify the continuance. 
The unconstitutional use of trust funds 
by the Legislature should be called such by this 
Court, and the decision below should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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